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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Mark B. Aronson appeals from the order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 
Peoples Natural Gas Co. ("Peoples Gas") on Aronson's claim 
that the billing practices of Peoples Gas violate the Truth in 
Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C.  1601 et seq. The District 
Court remanded to the state court two other claims 
Aronson brought against Peoples Gas, one for fraud and 
misrepresentation and the other for violation of the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law (the "Pennsylvania Act"), 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann.  201-1 et seq. Aronson has not sought to appeal the 
remand ruling. We therefore limit our consideration to the 
dismissal of the TILA claim, which raises an issue of first 




Aronson is a customer of Peoples Gas and has purchased 
utility services for his Allegheny County home since 1970. 
His August 21, 1997, utility bill included new charges of 
$16.24 and an accumulated balance of $541.12 for a total 
account balance of $557.36. The bill stated, "Please Pay By 
Sep 11, 1997 To Avoid A Late Payment Charge of $6.57 
(1.5%)." It also listed an optional payment amount of 
$113.00. Aronson's September 23 bill updated thesefigures 
to show an unpaid accumulated balance of $557.36, a late 
payment charge of $6.57, and new charges of $22.51, for a 
new account balance totaling $586.44. That bill stated, 
"Please Pay By Oct 14, 1997, To Avoid A Late Payment 
Charge of $6.91 (1.5%)," and listed an optional payment 
amount of $206.57. On October 3, Peoples Gas issued a 
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ten-day turn-off notice which stated the company would 
turn the gas service off if Aronson failed to pay the total 
amount of $557.36 by October 16. 
 
Aronson initially filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission ("PUC") on October 10, 1997, 
complaining of Peoples Gas's billing practices. 1 Prior to a 
final decision from the PUC, Aronson filed a substantially 
similar complaint in the Court of Common Pleas for 
Allegheny County in March 1998, and sought class 
certification. That complaint alleges that billing practices of 
Peoples Gas violate TILA because the bills do not contain a 
"due date," reveal the annual interest rate corresponding to 
the late payment charge, or explain how the 1.5% late 
payment charge is calculated. The bills refer only to "the 
amount you owe," without specifying whether that amount 
is the total balance, the current charges, or the optional 
payment amount. 
 
The complaint also alleges that the utility's billing 
practices deviate materially from the tariff Peoples Gas filed 
with the PUC, violate the Pennsylvania Act, perpetrate 
common law fraud, and contain fraudulent 
misrepresentations. 
 
Peoples Gas removed the action to the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1441. It is the position of Peoples 
Gas that the "Please Pay By" a specified date statement of 
the bill is in fact a due date, although written in courteous 
and customer-friendly language; that the bills inform 
customers both how the late payment fee is computed and 
how to avoid it; and that Peoples Gas never acted on the 
ten-day turn-off notice. Shortly after Peoples Gasfiled its 
answer, the District Court referred the matter to the 
Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings. 
 
After some activity, Peoples Gas moved for summary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The administrative law judge at the PUC ultimately dismissed the 
complaint in July 1998 for lack of jurisdiction over the TILA claim and 
for failure to carry the burden of proof as to the other claims. After 
considering Aronson's exceptions, the PUC unanimously rejected the 
exceptions on March 31, 1999. 
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judgment, asserting that "Regulation Z," promulgated by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
("Board"), exempted utility billing from TILA's requirements. 
See 12 C.F.R.  226.3(c). Aronson's verified response, see 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), emphasized, inter alia, that the Board 
had neither determined that a state regulatory body (here, 
the PUC) regulates the charges at issue, nor specifically 
exempted Peoples Gas. He attached a letter from a Board 
attorney stating that "the Federal Reserve's regulations do 
not apply to . . . public utility companies," App. at 58, 
which Aronson concluded meant that "Defendant as a 
public utility is exempt from Regulation Z." App. at 57. 
 
The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 
Recommendation recommending the grant of summary 
judgment for Peoples Gas on Aronson's TILA claim. The 
Magistrate Judge reasoned first that the fact that Peoples 
Gas files its tariff with the PUC pursuant to state law 
establishes that a state regulatory body indeed does 
regulate the tariff of Peoples Gas. The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the two state law claims (for common 
law fraud and misrepresentation and violation of the 
Pennsylvania Act) be remanded under 28 U.S.C. 
 1367(c)(3), rather than dismissed, because these claims 
involve complex issues of state law that would be better left 
to resolution by a state court. Aronson filed objections to 
the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations, 
but the District Court adopted the Report and 
Recommendations without change. Because of their 
decisions, neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District 
Judge reached the class action issue. 
 
Aronson filed a timely notice of appeal. After receiving the 
briefs of the parties, we invited the Board to file a brief 
amicus curiae, as the propriety and interpretation of its 
regulation are at issue, and it has obliged us with its brief. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291. We 
engage in plenary review of a district court's grant of 
summary judgment and consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-movant. Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. 
and Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 238 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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II. 
 
Aronson raises three issues on appeal. First, he claims 
that the Board exceeded its authority under TILA by 
creating a blanket exemption for public utilities; instead, he 
claims, the Board was required to make an individual 
determination whether the state in fact regulated the 
utility's tariffs. Second, Aronson contends that the District 
Court erred in holding that the Board had authority to 
issue a regulation exempting public utilities, such as 
Peoples Gas, "upon the mere filing of tariffs without proof 
of state regulatory control." Finally, Aronson contests the 
ruling that his testimony and documents were not 
admissible on summary judgment. 
 
Congress enacted TILA to promote "the informed use of 
credit," by assuring consumers "meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 
555, 559 (1980) (quoting 15 U.S.C.  1601). The statute 
requires that the lenders specify, inter alia, the finance 
charge and the annual percentage rate. See 15 U.S.C. 
 1605, 1606, 1638(a)(3),(4). This disclosure enables 
consumers to have the knowledge necessary to compare 
credit terms offered by competing lenders. Congress 
authorized the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe 
regulations to carry out the purpose of TILA. See 15 U.S.C. 
 1604(a). 
 
A provision of TILA exempts public utility charges as 
follows: 
 
        1603. Exempted transactions 
 
       This subchapter does not apply to the following: 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (4) Transactions under public utility tariffs, if the 
       Board determines that a State regulatory body 
       regulates the charges for the public utility services 
       involved, the charges for delayed payment, and any 
       discount allowed for early payment. 
 
15 U.S.C.A.  1603. 
 
Pursuant to its authority under TILA, the Board in turn 
promulgated Regulation Z. One of those regulations 
provides as follows: 
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        226.3 Exempt transactions. 
 
       This regulation does not apply to the following: 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (c) Public utility credit. An extension of credit that 
       involves public utility services provided through pipe, 
       wire, other connected facilities, or radio or similar 
       transmission (including extensions of such facilities), if 
       the charges for service, delayed payment, or any 
       discounts for prompt payment are filed with or 
       regulated by any government unit. The financing of 
       durable goods or home improvements by a public 
       utility is not exempt. 
 
12 C.F.R.  226.3 (footnote omitted). 
 
Aronson argues that the statutory language of TILA does 
not authorize the Board to make a blanket exemption for 
public utilities. He does not argue that the charges about 
which he complains are different than "the charges for 
delayed payments" referred to in the TILA exemption 
provision covered by  1603. Instead, he focuses on the 
statutory language that exempts a public utility's charges 
for delayed payment from TILA "if the Board determines 
that a State regulatory body regulates the charges for the 
public utility services involved." He argues that the Board 
must make an affirmative individualized determination that 
a state regulates the particular utility before that utility's 
charges become exempt from TILA. Aronson contends that 
in the absence of a factual finding that Pennsylvania does 
regulate Peoples Gas, the regulation's blanket exemption is 
arbitrary. Moreover, he contends that the regulation is 
arbitrary because it is not reasonably related to TILA. 
 
In arguing that the Board is required to make a 
determination of state regulation in each instance in which 
a utility claims exemption from a provision of TILA, 
Aronson in effect challenges the Board's authority to 
promulgate the provision of Regulation Z which broadly 
exempts utility charges that are "filed with or regulated by 
any government unit." We need look no further than the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Ford Motor Credit Co. for a 
discussion of the extent of the Board's authority under TILA 
and an explanation of its broad scope. 
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In that case, the Court stated that, because the 
complexity and variety of credit transactions covered by 
TILA "defy exhaustive regulation by a single statute[,] 
Congress . . . delegated expansive authority to the Federal 
Reserve Board to elaborate and expand the legal framework 
governing commerce in credit." Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 
U.S. at 559-60 (emphasis added). The Court then noted 
that "[t]he Board executed its responsibility by 
promulgating Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. Part 226 (1979), 
which at least partly fills the statutory gaps." Id. at 560. 
Later in the opinion, the Court stated, "Congress delegated 
broad administrative lawmaking power to the Federal 
Reserve Board when it framed TILA. . . . Furthermore, 
Congress has specifically designated the Federal Reserve 
Board and staff as the primary source for interpretation 
and application of truth-in-lending law." Id. at 566 (footnote 
omitted). 
 
The Board construes its broad power under TILA as 
permitting it to implement the exception either by a 
uniform rule or case by case. It opted for the former method 
by adopting the regulation that exempts certain utility 
credit transactions from TILA whenever "the charges . . . 
are filed with or regulated by any government unit." 12 
C.F.R.  226.3(c). As the Board's staff noted in a published 
position letter, "It was the Board's intention that this 
provision [in  226.3] embody an objective test, against 
which all public utility transactions could be measured to 
determine whether they are subject to the Truth-in-Lending 
Act, without the Board having to make an individual 
determination in each case." Federal Reserve Staff Position 
Letter No. 524 (Sept. 13, 1971). 
 
The Supreme Court considered the effect of a staff 
memorandum in Ford Motor Credit, and commented: 
 
       To be sure, the administrative interpretations proffered 
       in this case were issued by the Federal Reserve staff 
       rather than the Board. But to the extent that deference 
       to administrative views is bottomed on respect for 
       agency expertise, it is unrealistic to draw a radical 
       distinction between opinions issued under the 
       imprimatur of the Board and those submitted as 
       official staff memoranda. See FRB Public Information 
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       Letter No. 444, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH 
       Consumer Credit Guide  30,640. At any rate, it is 
       unnecessary to explore the Board/staff difference at 
       length, because Congress has conferred special status 
       upon official staff interpretations. See 15 U.S.C. 
        1640(f); 12 CFR  226.1(d)(1979). 
 
444 U.S. at 566 n.9. 
 
Moreover, it stated that "deference is especially 
appropriate in the process of interpreting the Truth in 
Lending Act and Regulation Z. Unless demonstrably 
irrational, Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing 
the Act or Regulation should be dispositive. . . ." Id. at 565. 
 
We cannot conclude that the Board's or its staff 's 
understanding of the statute or its authority is 
"demonstrably irrational." Therefore, we will defer to the 
Board's interpretation, and conclude that TILA does not 
require the Board to make a fact-specific determination in 
every exemption case. 
 
In light of this conclusion, Aronson's arguments based on 
the lack of any evidence that Peoples Gas made an 
individualized request for exemption are beside the point. 
No determination was necessary, so no request was 
required. It follows that the admissibility of the material 
that Aronson sought to introduce consisting of his 
verification in opposition to summary judgment, which was 
addressed to the Board's exemption of utility charges, was 
irrelevant.2 Moreover, we note that the courts that have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The trial court rejected the verification because it failed to set 
forth 
facts demonstrating Aronson's personal knowledge and competence to 
testify regarding the subject matter discussed and because portions of it 
constituted hearsay. Rule 56(e) requires that affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify as to the 
matters stated. Aronson contends that he has personal knowledge 
resulting from his conversations with others about whether Peoples Gas 
requested an exemption from the Board, whether the Board has 
exempted Peoples Gas, and whether Pennsylvania itself requested an 
exemption. We cannot conclude that the District Court abused its 
discretion in finding that Aronson's verification failed to meet this 
standard. Therefore, the District Court did not err in rejecting the 
verification for the reasons given. See, e.g., Hollander v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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considered arguments like Aronson's regarding late 
 537<!>payment assessments under TILA unequivocally have 
 
rejected them. See Ferguson v. Electric Power Bd. of 
Chattanooga, 378 F. Supp. 787, 790 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) 
("Acting pursuant to 15 U.S.C.  1604, the Federal Reserve 
Board has specifically exempted late charges in public 
utility bills from the disclosure provisions of the Act."), 
aff'd, 511 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1975); Grein v. Hawkins, 295 
So. 2d 219, 223 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (refusing to read TILA 
"restrictive[ly]" to require "positive action" by Board before 
exemption under  1603(4) is effective). We therefore reject 
Aronson's contention that the regulation is arbitrary and 
inapplicable here. 
 
We also reject Aronson's claim that the Board exceeded 
its authority in promulgating the regulation that exempts a 
utility's charges for service if they are "filed with . . . any 
government unit." Under the Board's expansive authority to 
implement TILA, it reasonably could interpret the reference 
of  1603(4) to charges that are "regulate[d]" to include 
charges that are "filed with" state authorities. 
 
In any event, it is clear that Pennsylvania both requires 
a utility to file its tariff and regulates utility rates. See 66 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  1301 et seq. There is also no 
question that Peoples Gas has filed the necessary tariffs 
with the Pennsylvania PUC and is regulated under 
Pennsylvania law. Therefore, we cannot conclude that 
application of TILA and Regulation Z to exempt Peoples Gas 




For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the 
District Court did not err in granting the motion of Peoples 
Gas for summary judgment. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                9 
